Aristotle's Philosophy of Communication
Rhetoric, dialectic, language, and thought
Aristotle’s philosophy of communication complements his normative philosophy. Given his definition of citizenship, and given that he regards political activity as essential to human life, and given his optimism about the capacity of “the many” to make good decisions collectively, rhetoric assumes an important role in political life. Barring the hypothetical case in which a virtuous monarch with exceptional abilities singlehandedly administers a state, any genuine form of government is going to require that its citizens engage in collective decision-making.
Aristotle calls rhetoric an art (technē), which is usually associated with production, but he suggests that rhetoric also has theoretical and practical dimensions:
The truth is . . . that rhetoric is a combination of the science of logic and of the ethical branch of politics . . . . But the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for we shall be passing into the region of sciences dealing with definite subjects rather than simply with words and forms of reasoning. (Rhetoric 1359b 9-17)
George A. Kennedy suggests that Aristotle regards rhetoric, like dialectic, as a “tool discipline”, and as such it has theoretical, practical, and productive levels of activity (Classical Rhetoric,78).
On the theoretical level, rhetoric is about “observing in any given case the available means of persuasion” (1355b 25). On the practical level, “the duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate on without arts or systems to guide us [i.e., without arts or systems that specifically pertain to the subject of deliberation], in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning” (1357a 1). On the productive/poetic side, Aristotle discusses figures of speech and what would come to be known as the canons of rhetoric, despite characterizing such matters as inessential to the systematic study of rhetoric.
The passages quoted above also illustrate something of Aristotle’s ideas concerning rhetoric and dialectic. Aristotle says that rhetoric is “the counterpart” and “a branch” of dialectic, which he discusses in Topics. Neither are limited to any specific subject matter, and both make use of deductive and inductive reasoning. Aristotle also distinguishes both from demonstration, which he discusses in the Analytics, and from fallacious reasoning, which he discusses in On Sophistical Refutations.
The main difference between dialectic and rhetoric, as Aristotle conceived of them, is that dialectic is used for theoretical purposes while rhetoric is used for practical purposes (pace Kennedy). The aim of dialectic is to uncover probable truth about questions that cannot be settled demonstratively. The aim of rhetoric is right action, i.e., action that conforms to the ancient triad of good (or expedient), just, and honorable, corresponding to the ends of political, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric, respectively (1358b 20 ff.). Rhetoric might therefore be called applied dialectic.
For Aristotle, rhetoric is part of “the ethical branch of politics”. Concerning the morality of the practice of rhetoric itself, Aristotle notes that what makes someone a “dialectician” is his faculty, and what makes someone a “sophist” is his moral purpose (i.e., to mislead an audience using specious reasoning), but the term “rhetorician” can refer to either his faculty or his moral purpose (i.e., to persuade an audience). This supports what was said above about the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, and also distinguishes the proper use of persuasive techniques from improper uses of them.
Aristotle is aware of such abuses but believes that the odds favor those who argue for the true and the good. This is another instance of his optimism about collective deliberation, for he says “things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites”. Aristotle says that it is the speakers themselves who are to blame for wrong judgments, not rhetoric.
Aristotle’s endorsement of collective inquiry does not imply constructivism. The truth is not created by consensus; it is there to be discovered, and it will be discovered if rhetors do their job skillfully and in good faith.
Concerning truth itself, Aristotle holds what has come to be known as a correspondence theory of truth, i.e., truth is a property of representations that accurately represent reality:
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be. (Metaphysics 1011b25)
Our language represents our thought, and our thought represents reality truly or falsely.
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us. (On Interpretation, 16a2-9)
Other things being equal, the “available means of persuasion” will favor the true and the just. Aristotle’s philosophy of communication is therefore integral to his practical philosophy. Human flourishing (eudaimonia) requires rhetoric and dialectic, for rhetoric and dialectic are the means by which the community linked by love/friendship (philia) engages in the collaborative search for truth that constitutes the life of contemplation (theōria) and the collaborative search for right action that makes this life possible, and the success of these inquiries will depend on the virtue (aretē) of the collaborators. The “political animal” cannot achieve its inherent purpose (telos) without rhetoric and dialectic.